President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that Ukraine ‘faces a very difficult choice’ – but so now does Europe. The 28 point ‘peace plan’ advanced by the White House presents European leaders with their biggest test of the Ukraine war: to show whether there is any meaning in their pledge to do ‘whatever it takes for as long as it takes’ (to quote Keir Starmer, Rishi Sunak and Ursula von der Leyen, and others). 

For the sake of European security and prosperity, European leaders should rapidly agree to release Russia’s frozen assets for the support of Ukraine. And they should clearly state their willingness to defend Ukraine in the face of future Russian aggression. 

Whatever the outcome, there is no question that the 28-point ‘peace plan’…is a defining moment in this war.

They must find a way to impress President Donald Trump and his team with their arguments – even as the US administration makes clear it does not much care about the role of European countries in securing the outcome of the war.

Europe’s leaders have moved too slowly on supplying Ukraine with weapons and on releasing Russia’s frozen assets; they have been complacent about Ukraine’s ability to withstand the Russian onslaught and their ability to persuade Trump to appreciate Ukraine’s perspective. This is their last chance. 

A defining moment

Whatever the outcome, there is no question that the 28-point ‘peace plan’ that emerged from the talks between US envoy Steve Witkoff and his Russian counterpart Kirill Dmitriev (the subject of US sanctions) is a defining moment in this war. Egregiously favourable towards Russia’s interests, it blindsided European leaders. 

Of all its points, four are particularly offensive to Ukraine and jeopardize its future security – as they do Europe’s. First is the demand to surrender the ‘fortress towns’ of the Donbas which many Ukrainians have died defending, and which act as a bulwark between Russian forces and the plains leading west to Kyiv. Second is the cap on the size of the Ukrainian army and the bar to NATO countries’ forces being stationed in Ukraine. Third is the appropriation of Russian frozen assets for Russian-US investment ventures, from which the US would keep half of the ‘profits’. Fourth is the declaration of an amnesty for both sides. As well as adding insult to injury for Ukraine, this would undermine the legal basis for seizing the frozen Russian assets by absolving Moscow of blame. 

The plan contains some points in Ukraine’s favour. The blunt assertion that all children stolen by Russia will be returned can perhaps be attributed to Melania Trump, who has voiced her concern on this. If realized (a big ‘if’), it would be of immeasurable relief to those families who have lost hope of their children’s return. 

There is also a declaration that Ukraine will gain early entry to the European Union. In that lies a potential contradiction with the other points in the plan: EU members make a commitment to each other’s defence, albeit in terms not clearly specified. It is also unclear that Ukraine would meet normal requirements of EU entry, given the corruption scandal which has felled several of those close to Zelenskyy. 

But these points do not outweigh the many in the plan that favour Russia and threaten Ukraine’s sovereignty and security. 

Red lines

Ukraine has now spelled out its ‘red lines’. European leaders, after urgent meetings, put forward their own suggestions and amendments to the peace plan, not wanting to provoke Trump by rejecting his version but  hoping – once again – to influence him in their direction. 

Ukraine has just days to work out whether the European voices will help secure it a better deal, whether it should be prepared to fight on without US help, or whether, however unjust, this is the best an exhausted country can get. Its best course must be to play as long a game as it can in the negotiations to explore better terms.

What Trump’s US has become

The past week should lay to rest any question about what the US under Trump has become. This is an administration bent on the commercial and financial interests of the US, interpreted in the narrowest way. Principles of the rule of law, of democracy and sovereignty play no part, even though the US in the past has been their loudest advocate. Nor do concerns about the future security of Europe. Indeed, the remarks from the Trump team and those close to them are suffused with a righteousness which sees European countries as freeloaders on US taxpayers.

The real decisions now lie with European national leaders. They should finally release Russian frozen assets to Ukraine.

While Trump himself is scripting some of this (by Truth Social posts), the ‘peace plan’ echoes remarks made by Vice President JD Vance. But America’s allies should not make the mistake of assuming that such sentiments will end with the Trump presidency. The Maga movement will outlast Trump. And Republicans in Congress have been notable by their silence, even though this latest twist has brought a little more censure. Governments dealing with Washington should assume that the US wishes to disengage from Europe’s future, until American voters clearly demonstrate otherwise.

The spotlight then falls on Europe. Von der Leyen this week responded with a deluge of impotent imperatives (the ‘centrality of the EU in securing peace for Ukraine must be fully reflected’  and that ‘Ukraine must have the freedom and sovereign right to choose its own destiny’). That is, however, as it has become fashionable to say, the world as she would like it to be - not the world as it is.         

© Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2025